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Financial Deregulation: Repeal or Adjust? 
 
By Claude Lopez1 and Elham Saeidinezhad2 
 
While a major overhaul of U.S. financial regulation may be unlikely during the 
early months of the Trump administration, changes should be expected as his 
nominees to lead the Treasury Department and financial regulatory agencies are 
confirmed. This will be the biggest turnover in regulatory leadership since the 
passage in 2010 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and it may also prove to be a test for 
Basel III, the macroprudential policy framework created by the G20 countries in 
response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
Dodd-Frank, which has never been fully implemented, is the legislative vehicle for 
U.S. integration of Basel III recommendations.3 The act aims to limit systemic risk, 
allow for the safe resolution of the largest intermediaries, increase scrutiny of 
risky nonbanks, and reform derivatives trading. The Financial Choice Act, 
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives last year as an alternative to 
Dodd-Frank, proposes significant changes in financial regulation. Although it is 
unlikely that the Financial Choice Act will pass, it is considered by many to be the 
blueprint for the regulatory revisions to come.4  
 
                                                           
1 Claude Lopez, PhD, leads the International Finance and Macroeconomics research team at the Milken 
Institute..clopez@milkeninstitute.org. 
2 Elham Saeidinezhad, PhD, is a research economist on the team. 
3 See http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/view/812 for more details on the Dodd-Frank Act. 
4 The regulatory easing concerns only part of the regulatory framework. No change in stance is expected regarding the anti-
money laundering (AML) regulations. 
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There may be uncertainty about what will be changed and when, but there is no 
doubt that there will be turnover among senior staff at regulatory agencies. In 
addition to President Trump’s appointments to lead the Treasury Department, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC), the incoming administration will also be able to 
nominate new heads of the banking authorities, namely the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), 
and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, all within the next 18 months. More 
specifically, three new commissioners, the maximum allowed from any one 
political party, will be nominated for both the SEC and the CFTC. The terms for 
current leadership of the OCC, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve expire in April 
2017, November 2017, and February 2018, respectively. The key position of vice 
chairman for supervision also is vacant at the Fed.5 (The directors of the OCC and 
the Consumer Financial Protection Board [CFPB] serve on the FDIC’s board.6) 
The diagram below provides an overview of the U.S. financial regulatory 
structure. It shows that these changes will affect the entire financial sector, 
including banks, insurance companies, financial market utilities (FMUs), and 
securities markets. Furthermore, seven of the 10 voting members of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which coordinates U.S. macroprudential policy, 
will be replaced. These new regulators will have substantial authority, both as 
individual agency chiefs and as members of the FSOC, to change the way Dodd-
Frank is applied. They can do this without going through Congress or even 
adjusting their own formal rule-making processes. For example, agency chiefs can 
change enforcement priorities by “amending or rescinding and replacing related 
guidance, such as interpretations of rules, internal policies and manuals.”7 Unlike 
the repeal of Dodd-Frank or a rule change, a new direction in guidance and 
interpretation can be ordered and implemented almost immediately.  
 
                                                           
5 The term of the vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board ends in June 2018. 
6 The CFPB director’s term expires in July 2018. 
7 See http://www.capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NBTF_Regulatory_Reform_.pdf 
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Diagram: Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Structure 
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In light of the leadership overhaul at the regulatory agencies, the blueprint 
defined by the Financial Choice Act, and the softer tone regarding Dodd-Frank 
revamping, the incoming administration may first focus on changes that would 
 
 
U.S. Treasury (Chairperson) 
CFPB: Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau  
CFTC: Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission    
FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation  
FHFA: Federal Housing Finance Agency  
FRB: Federal Reserve Board   
NCUA: National Credit Union 
Administration  
OCC: Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency  
SEC: Securities and Exchange 
Commission insurance expert 
 
 
 
FIO: Federal Insurance Office  
A state insurance regulator  
A state banking supervisor  
A state securities commissioner  
 
FSOC Non-Voting 
FSOC Voting Members 
4 
 
provide regulatory relief to the financial sector without altering the formal rules. 
In that context, the following are potential targets for early change: 
• The FSOC’s authority to designate “systemically important” nonbank 
institutions (FMUs, including clearing organizations and payment systems, 
and nonbank financial companies) has been criticized and challenged, most 
notably in the FSOC's recision of GE Capital's designation as systemically 
important last year. New voting FSOC members may simply choose not to 
designate new systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and 
reverse existing designations. As a result, nonbank companies would no 
longer be subject to enhanced Fed supervision. The FSOC may also shift its 
attention away from asset managers to focus on streamlining regulations 
across agencies instead of creating new regulations. 
 
• The SEC and the CFTC are likely to limit the scope of future securities 
regulations. This includes current efforts to regulate high-frequency trading 
and security-based swaps. Furthermore, the issuance of fiduciary rules for 
financial advisers and rules for asset manager stress testing will not remain 
a priority for the SEC.8 Both agencies may emphasize penalties against 
individuals rather than against corporations in an effort to hold individuals 
accountable. The result would be more civil and criminal prosecutions for 
fraud and self-dealing. 
 
• The FDIC is currently the “orderly liquidation authority” under Title II of 
Dodd-Frank and, as such, it can theoretically liquidate a SIFI in difficulty 
outside of the normal bankruptcy code. However, the FDIC can act only 
after the secretary of the treasury decides to place the SIFI under FDIC 
receivership. This procedure has never been used, and it seems rather 
unlikely that it will be under the new administration. The potential 
                                                           
8 On a similar note, the Department of Labor’s (DOL) fiduciary duty rule will likely survive but may encounter significant delay in 
its implementation. 
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amendment of the federal bankruptcy code to facilitate procedures when it 
comes to SIFIs is directly related to this point.    
 
• Banking organizations may benefit from an increase in Dodd-Frank’s $50 
billion asset threshold, which automatically designates them as SIFIs and 
subjects them to higher supervision standards.9 The Fed proposed in 
September 2016 to exempt the capital plans of smaller banks from scrutiny 
testing under Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress 
testing and resolution planning.10 The increase in the threshold has 
bipartisan support; however, it would have limited impact because banking 
agencies have already eased regulatory pressure for banks with less than 
$100 billion in assets.11  
Similar easing seems rather unlikely for the largest banks in the short term, 
but they may benefit from potential changes or further delay in the 
implementation of the Volcker Rule’s limits on proprietary trading. 
Concerns regarding the rule’s complexity as well as its impact on market 
liquidity are widespread, which may explain the recurring postponement of 
its full implementation. The new deadline for conformance is July 2017. 
 
• The CFPB’s leadership structure has often been called into question, 
especially since November 2016, when a federal court ruled it 
unconstitutional because its single director can be removed only “for 
cause” during his five-year term. Changes will be likely if the CFPB’s appeal 
fails. 
To sum up, more than six years after the advent of Dodd-Frank, many are calling 
for a reassessment to ease the burden it places on financial-services companies, 
especially banks. The softened rhetoric of the new administration is quite 
different from the aggressive calls for repeal that were common during the 
                                                           
9 A Banking Organization is defined to include 1) insured depository institutions 2) bank holding and savings and loan companies 
and 3) all companies that are treated as bank holding companies under the International Banking Act. 
10 See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/09/30/2016-23629/amendments-to-the-capital-plan-and-stress-test-
rules 
11 See https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20140508a.htm 
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campaign, and suggests a more subtle approach to regulatory change. This new 
tack also is more in line with the broader international debate. The pressure for 
regulatory change is not confined to the U.S. The latest delays in the finalization 
of Basel III’s banking rules show that the post-crisis regulatory framework itself is 
under scrutiny.12  
 
                                                           
12 The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS), the oversight body of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, postponed a Jan. 8 meeting due to disagreement over new capital requirements for lenders. 
